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Abstract
Side channel attacks are based on side channel information, which is information that is leaked from encryption
systems. Implementing side channel attacks is possible if and only if an attacker has access to a cryptosystem
(victim) or can interact with cryptosystem remotely to compute time statistics of information that collected from
targeted system. Cache timing attack is a special type of side channel attack. Here, timing information caused
by cache effect is collected and analyzed by an attacker to guess sensitive information such as encryption key or
plaintext. Cache timing attack against AES was known theoretically until Bernstein carry out a real
implementation of the attack. Fortunately, this attack can be a success only by exploiting bad implementation in
software or hardware, not for algorithm structure weaknesses, and that means attack could be prevented if
proper implementation has been used. For that reason, modification in software and hardware has been
proposed as countermeasures. This paper reviews the technique applied in this attack, surveys the
countermeasures against it, and evaluates the feasibility and usability of each countermeasure. We made
comparison between these countermeasure based on certain aspect furthermore.
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INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, attacks rely on mathematical analysis to break math-based cryptographic algorithms. These attacks
use several methods such as linear and differential cryptanalysis. In order to break cryptography algorithms, the
attacker can either work on ciphertext alone or a plaintext-ciphertext pair. This is done using various types of
attacks such as: cipher text only, known plaintext, chosen ciphertext or chosen plaintext. In addition, attacks can
be performed by obtaining extra information from encryption devices, which simplifies discovering the key or
plaintext. These devices can allow a new way of leaking important information about the cipher, which may
increase the likelihood of recognizing the original text or the key used in the encryption processes. This leaked
information gathered from the encryption device is called side channel information. It can be about plaintext or
ciphertext as obtained during the encryption process. This caused the development of a new type of attack
dubbed the side channel attack. It branches out into timing attacks, power consumption attack, fault analysis
attack, and acoustic attack and other. (Osvik , Shamir and Tromer, 2006).
This paper focuses on a specific implementation of cache timing attack against AES algorithm which is a
Bernstein cache timing attack (that is explained in section 3.2). It then identifies countermeasures that developed
to avoid this attack by reviewing the literature and examining different works that propose countermeasures to
such attack from several aspects. Finally several comparisons of these countermeasures were presented. This
paper is organized as follows: In section two, a brief description of AES is given. Section three explains the
cache timing attack and Bernstein practical implementation of cache timing attack is described to show how the
attack works and to prepare for countermeasures of the attack that is introduced in section four. In section five,
these countermeasures are discussed and compared. Finally section eight conclude the paper.

ADVANCE ENCRYPTION STANDARD
In 1997, national institution for standard and technology (NIST) posed a competition for researchers around
cryptography community to propose their algorithms in order to choose AES and to replace data encryption
standard (DES). Rijndael cipher (Daemen, J., Rijmen, V., 2003). was chosen as AES algorithm, which was
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developed by two researchers, Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen. Rijndael is a family of ciphers with different
keys and block sizes. (Schwartz, 2000)
AES consist of four operations which are byte substitution, shift rows, mix column and add round key. These
operations are repeated in a number of rounds except the final round which does not contain mix column
operation. Input block size in AES is 128 bit and key size is optional 128,192 or 256. Number of rounds depend
on the key size, it uses 10, 12, 14 round with 128, 192, 256 key size respectively.
Substitution operation in AES is based on lookup tables, which is termed as S-box. Also it may use several
lookup tables that make it faster in execution due the ability to perform lookup mapping in parallel manner, Sbox lookups use input-dependent indices that loaded from addresses in memory.
In spite of strength of AES against known attacks, cache timing attack could success due to the increases in size
of lookup table, it might be became vulnerable to leaking information from cache memory which can be
exploited to perform an attack in different way , resulting in a security defect on AES algorithm.

CACHE TIMING ATTACKS ON AES
Historical Background
Cache timing attack is used to extract encryption key or plaintext. This attack is based on the fact that each
mathematical computation takes certain time. Gathering side channel information from the cache in order to
break AES encryption has been discussed in several previous works.
Hu (1992) noted this issue via covert channel in context of international transmission.
After four years, Kelsey (1998) stated that large S-box has a probability to be attacked by exploiting cache hit
rate to steal sensitive information.
(Francois and Quisquaterm 1999) described timing attack that exploits bad implementation of AES software that
performs algebraic equation in bad manner (such as performing Mix Column using conditional branch).
After that Page (2002) theoretically mentioned that cache misses can be exploited by an attacker, but it only
work if there exist high temporal period of cache miss, but he did not show this attack in practical
implementation.
As mentioned in (Tsunoo et al., 2002) and (Tsunoo et al., 2003) that lookups process inside cipher can be used
to launch timing attack due to the delay in accessing the memory.
This attack was known theoretically until Bernstein (2005) demonstrates a real implementation of the attack on
AES cryptosystem. He described several weaknesses that attackers can use to crack AES encryption. His attack
uses time variances that caused by cache effect, and relies on statistical timing pattern that has been collected
from memory access.
Bernstein Cache Timing attack
What Bernstein proposed was a technique to reduce the AES key space by performing brute-force for locating
the final key the Bernstein attack assumes that the computer executing the encryption uses cache memory,
which can be described in a simple model of the cache. In this model, values are looked up in the main memory,
and then transferred to the cache, evicting existing values to the memory. This noted assumption, however, has
provided the attacker with ways to obtain the encrypted data from cache easily. (Bernstein, 2005)
Bernstein utilized the leaked time variances, resulting from different inputs using a known initial key. Based on
these measurements, comparisons were made to time variances caused by encryption using an unknown key.
This timing information can be used to extract the full encryption key in a specified key space. (Bernstein, 2005)
This attack is based on measuring the time variances in encryption of various inputs under a known key, and
comparing these to time variances under a secret unknown key. With enough timing information the full key can
be recovered. The first stage of the attack is to create a replica server with the same CPU and running the same
implementation of AES as the victim server, but with a known key. From another machine, many random
packets of 800-byte, 600-byte and 400-byte lengths are encrypted and sent to the server. The time taken to
encrypt each packet is recorded and used to build a time pattern for each input bit. The next stage is to launch
the attack against the victim server. First, an encrypted zero from the server is obtained and recorded for later
use. Again packets of varying length are sent from the attacking machine and encrypted by the server. The time
taken for encryption of each packet is recorded. Finally the timings from the victim server are compared with
those of the replica server to produce a set of possible key bits. The set of possibilities is searched until a
combination has been found that produces the encrypted zero obtained earlier. This combination is the victim
machine’s AES key (O’Hanlon & Tonge, 2005). Figure 1 shows these steps.
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(b)

(c)

Figure 1: (a) prepare for the attack by collecting a large body of reference timing data for each xi0 (b) collect a
large body of timing data from a target machine for the plaintext byte pi (c) The target machine’s timing data
should be shifted from the reference data by exactly ki.

CACHE TIMING COUNTERMEASURES
Cache No Fill mode
Dev (2013) countermeasure for this attack is to activate a no-fill mode in cache memory, in this mode the
memory accesses are serviced from the cache when they hit it, but miss accesses is serviced directly from
memory (without causing evictions and filling). The encryption routine would then proceed as follows:
(i) Prefetching lookup table of AES into the cache.
(ii) Then, set cache mode to no-fill mode.
(iii) Execute encryption process.
(iv) Finally no-fill mode is disabled.
In step (i) and (ii) it is necessary to ensure that no another process is running. However, once this step is done,
step (iii) can be carried out safely. Performance of encryption would not be affected because its inputs are prefetched into cache before no-fill mode is activated. On the other hand, its output will not be cached, and this
cause subsequent cache misses. Simultaneous processes executed during (iii), through multitasking, thus will
degrade performance as a result. Separating encryption process into smaller pieces then performing previous
procedure to each piece thus could reduce effect somewhat, by allowing the cache to be occasionally updated to
reflect the changing memory work set. (Dev, 2013)
Cache Partitioning
One of effective countermeasures is the cache partitioning. The basic idea is to allocate locations in cache to
load values of t-table, thus t-table will usually be located in specific locations that is never overwritten by data
of another process until encryption is performed. As a result, access pattern of cache will be changed in
encryption process by this manner; figure 2 shows the code of cache partitioning.

Figure 2: Piece of code of cache partitioning

Fixed Number Of Clock Cycles
(Jayasinghe, Ragel and Elkaduwa, 2014) stated that the AES software implementation is rescheduled such that it
will take constant time for execution. Figure 3 shows the part of the code executed for the first round inside AES
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encrypt function implementation. Initially a fixed number is defined (line 1). By using a time stamp, number of
clock cycles for each round is obtained (lines 2-7). Then the difference between the two is obtained (line 8), i.e
the fixed number and the number of clock cycles for each round. Then, a loop is included where it runs from
zero to the number that is obtained (line 9). This is done for every round.

Figure 3: AES fixed cycle round algorithm.
Fixed number method takes additional clock cycles than the usual. The researchers observed that it is
approximately 2.1 times higher than the number of clock cycles in the unprotected AES implementation. In
addition, it was detected that some of the key bytes are missing after the usage of this modified AES
implementation. The attacker will be unable to recognize the authentic timing pattern properly because of the
incorrect timing information. Also it was observed that the total number of possible keys is considered a large
value when compared with the original AES implementation. (Jayasinghe, Ragel & Elkaduwa, 2014)
Average number of clock cycles
reference (Jayasinghe, Ragel and Elkaduwa, 2014) also proposed that instead of defining a fixed number of
clock cycles by an outsider (such as a programmer), numbers of clock cycles for rounds themselves are used to
calculate an average and to perform constant encryption time by equaling clock cycles up to the averaged
value. Figure 4 shows the code fragment implemented for the fifth round inside AES encryption function in
AES implementation.
Initially by defining a time stamp, number of clock cycles for each round is obtained (lines 1-7). Then the
average is calculated incrementally for each round (lines 8, 9 and 10). In between each round a FOR loop is
included where it executes from zero to the number that is obtained as the difference of average value and the
clock cycle value of the particular round (line 11).
After implementing real experiments in this algorithm the (Jayasinghe, Ragel and Elkaduwa, 2014) observed
that it is approximately 1.19 times greater than the number of clock cycles in the unprotected method.
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Figure 4: AES average cycle round encryption algorithm.

After implementing their AES algorithm in real server (Jayasinghe, Ragel and Elkaduwa, 2014) noticed that
some of the key bytes have been missing. So, the attack has been unable to recognize the authentic timing
pattern properly because of the wrong timing information. Depending on their implementation results, the total
number of possible keys was very large. That is a considerably large value when compared with the original
AES implementation. Therefore, it will be impossible to find the correct key even with the attack tested.
CPU Architecture Enhancements
Instead of prevent cache timing attack by software implementation enhancements, CPU architecture can be built
in a way that can protect from this attack. In the following two sections AES Instruction set and Multicore CPU
is described then following a real implementation of this technique shows its immunity against cache timing
attack.
AES Instruction set (AES-IN)
Intel and AMD develop an extension of X86 instruction set for multiprocessor to increase speed and security of
AES encryption. (Mowery, Keelveedhi and Shacham, 2008)
AES-IN provides hardware Implementations of key generation, encryption rounds, and decryption rounds. The
cryptographic operations are moved out of RAM and into custom hardware, improving performance and
eliminating cache side channels. (Mowery, Keelveedhi and Shacham, 2008).
1.1.1 Experiments on modern CPU Architecture
(Mowery, Keelveedhi and Shacham, 2008) make a demonstration of Bernstein cache timing attack on Intel
Core i5, Intel Xeon E5410 and Intel Atom N2800 and show how these new processors enhanced protection
cache timing attack. Bernstein attack demonstration consists of three parts: preparing the attack, executing the
attack, and analyzing the outcome. In the preparation, known AES key, that is, all zeros with number of packets
were sent to the server having n[14] = 250.
The attack was carried out in a similar fashion as the preparation, the different is that it sending a 16-byte
secret key taken from the pseudorandom number generator of the server’s OS (assume to be a victim machine)
instead of a known AES key (assume to be in attacker machine). After sending random packet analyzing of the
attack take place by correlating the lines obtained from the preparation and from the attack to produce 16
correlations, one per byte, which show if the secret key could be easily guessed. If the produced number of
possibilities is lower than 256 for a given key byte, then the range of possibilities to guess that secret byte is
narrowed (Mowery, Keelveedhi and Shacham, 2008).
In test one and two, the range of possibilities was 256 for all the correlations, which indicates that the
correlation was not extracting any useful information about the secret key, showing that the attack to the
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Intel Core i5 and Intel Xeon E5410 was not successful. But in test three, the range of possibilities that was
produced by correlating the preparation and the attack was narrower than the previous test (around 113),
which indicates that the correlation was extracting some information, although limited, about the secret key,
showing that the attack to the Intel Atom N2800 was somewhat successful (Mowery, Keelveedhi and Shacham ,
2008).

CONSTANT TIME ENCRYPTION VIA SCHEDULING THE INSTRUCTION
(Jayasinghe et al., 2012) achieved constant time encryption via rescheduling the instructions while maintaining
the same cache structure of the system. They did not make any hardware changes, their approach depended on
the encryption cycles to thwart delays due to cache misses.
Their proposed countermeasure has three major steps:i. Decomposition of OpenSSL AES encryption code into smaller bitwise operations
The decomposition process was made so that it will operate like the instruction scheduling process of a
compiler. They performed manual scheduling without the compiler optimization which resulted in increasing
the size of the code and execution penalty. However they recommended integrating these schedules into the
compiler so it would be able to carry out “side-channel aware” scheduling.
ii. Add each and every bitwise instruction sets to queues.
This was done by queuing the decomposed instructions to automate schedule implementation.
iii. Processing each queue.
Each queue can be carried out independently since they are data and control independent from each other.
However, this step modified the normal execution by adding the instruction asm(“nop”) to stall the processor to
hide data loading time in arithmetic operations for each queue.

COUNTERMEASURE COMPARISION
After surveying different countermeasures to understand their mechanisms, they are now to be discussed in
terms of their advantages and disadvantages.
Cache no fill mode as a countermeasure prevent cache timing attack by activating cache no fill mode. In this
approach lookup table is first pre-fetched into cache then activate no fill mode and execute encryption, So all
processes will cause cache hit, therefore leading to great advantage of increasing encryption time than the
normal execution and all input encryption will have equal time so no information will be leaked, and this due to
eliminating the cache miss effect. On the other hand, activation of no-fill mode occurs concurrently with other
processes, thus it will preventing the use of the cache memory by the other processes. As a result, this leads to
degradation in other processes performance until the encryption is completed and no fill mode is deactivated.
Fixed cycle time of round countermeasure enforce each round to take fixed constant time, if the round time is
less than constant time loop of asm(nop) instruction will append until fixed time has been achieved, this
technique success in prevent attack without any information leaked because the attacker will observe that any
encryption will take a fixed time. The drawback of this countermeasure is it need to determine the constant time
by an outsider (e.g programmer) and it’s difficult to determine the appropriate fixed time, if the time is too long
this may result in degradation of performance and if time is short some rounds will exceed the fixed time and
some information will be leaked and reducing security.
Average cycle time of rounds as countermeasure seems to be better than fixed time approach in determining
time efficiently, but it also has degradation in performance comparing with original approach.
CPU architecture enhancement is very effective countermeasure because hardware implementation protect from
the attack and not provide any information that can be used in this attack. The major advantage is that there is
not any effect on encryption performance. However, AES-IN need to make modification in all software to be
secure against cache timing and can't protect against the attack if software is not altered to call AES-IN.
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Countermeasures Comparison
Effect in performance of
Countermeasure

Countermeasure Type
Key Space

Encryption

Other Process

Cache NO Fill Mode

ــــ

High

High

ــــ

Cache Partitioning

Low

Medium

High

ــــ

Fixed Cycle Round Time

High

ــــ

High

ــــ

Medium

ــــ

Medium

ــــ

AES-IN

ــــ

ــــ

High



Multicore

ــــ

ــــ

High



Scheduling the Instructions

Medium

ــــ

High

Average Cycle Round
Time

Hardware

ــــ

Software



ــــ


Table 1: countermeasure comparisons in performance and key space and type.

CONCLUSION
First a general background about AES algorithm is given together with a brief introduction and review about
cache timing attack. The Bernstein implementation for cache timing attack is described. In this work, several
countermeasures are explored, and the techniques they followed are presented and how they prevent the attack.
Cache timing can be avoided using software or hardware countermeasures. Each countermeasure has its
advantages and disadvantages, a table showing this comparison is presented. As any other tool, each is
appropriate in a certain environment for a particular purpose. Finally a comparison between these
countermeasures in terms of type, performance and key space size that attacker can gain was shown.
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